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A B S T R A C T 
The aim of this study was to examine the effect of audit committee independence (ACI) on the financial 
performance of insurance firms in Kenya. The study analyzed data from the 55 insurance firms licensed 
by the Insurance Regularity Authority (IRA) in Kenya. ACI was operationalized by the number of 
independent directors serving in the boards of insurance firms operating in Kenya. Primary data was 
collected from a sample of 412 board directors, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Chief Finance 
Officers (CFOs), Audit Committee members (AUDIND) and Internal Auditors (INAUD) using a 
questionnaire instrument while secondary data was retrieved from audited financial reports of year 
2017. Data was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Firm performance was measured 
by the two accounting-based measures Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE). The 
findings from the regression analysis indicate that audit committee independence significantly and 
positively affects the financial performance of insurance firms in Kenya.  
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Introduction 
Corporate governance has become a major subject of discussion for researchers, policy makers and private sector leaders alike 
because of the critical role it plays in the management of both public and corporate affairs (Foo & Witkowska, 2011; Momoh and 
Ukpong (2013). The discipline became popular after the 1970s following the integration of global markets (Malik & Makhdoom, 
2016). The development of international standards and the growing global debate on the subject is clear evidence of the importance 
of corporate governance (Sookram, 2016). The unexpected collapse of some of the most respected firms such as Enron and 
WorldCom in 2001 (Davies & Schlitzer, 2008) and the 2008-2009 global financial crisis that saw corporate failures on an 
unprecedented scale rekindled the need and impetus for strengthening governance structures (Foo & Witkowska, 2011).  
According to Okeahalam (2004), a significant number of firm failures have been blamed on the lack of timely disclosure and effective 
corporate governance. A number of sources (Okeahalam, 2004; Luhman & Cunliffe, 2013; Price, Roman & Rountree, 2010; Braga-
Alves & Shastri, 2011) explain the critical role good corporate governance plays in the improvement of firm financial performance, 
creating an enabling investment environment and thus protecting investor and stakeholder rights and encouraging overall economic 
development. In majority of developing countries, financial malpractice in many firms has increasingly necessitated the need for 
improved corporate governance practices (Baydoun, Maguire, Ryan & Willet, 2013).  
The independence of the board and its activities from influence is seen as a key pillar of, good corporate governance practice (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Heenetigala & Armstrong, 2011; Fadun, 2013). As a result, most corporate governance guidelines in the world today 
extol the independence virtue, among them the OECD principles of corporate governance, the King Code of South Africa, the UK 
corporate governance code and Kenya’s code of governance for state corporations (Mwongozo). The Corporate Governance 
Guideline (CCG) of Kenya’s insurance industry regulator (Insurance Regulatory Authority [IRA CGG], 2011) outlines the 
constitution and the function of the audit committee of the board for insurers in Kenya. The code specifies the composition of the 
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audit committee and gives special mention to the Chair of the committee as an independent director. Key among the functions of the 
audit committee as outlined by this guideline is oversight over the internal and external audit functions. The guideline also limits any 
influence the CEO may have on the audit function (see pages 9-10). This underlines the importance that the Kenyan insurance 
regulator attaches to the independence of the audit committee of the board. This is consistent with the expectations of both King III 
(2009) and King IV (2016) of South Africa, which in fact, require the entire audit committee of the board to be made up of “suitably 
skilled and experienced independent non-executive directors” (King III, 2009, p.31). Empirical findings support this view as well. 
For instance, Heenetigala and Armstrong (2011) argued that audit committees should be independent and carry out their 
responsibilities with due professional care and hence when there are financial manipulation cases, the audit committee should be held 
accountable for it, thus the need for full transparency of financial information to enable minimization of information asymmetry. 
Though consistent with the agency theory and works as an additional control mechanism that ensures that the shareholders’ interests 
are being safeguarded, the role of the audit committee equally serves the wider stakeholders. For instance, M.Z. Islam, M.N. Islam 
and A.K.M.Z. Islam (2010) recognize an independent audit committee as one of the most important mechanisms for preventing both 
agency problems and failure of other corporate governance instruments. They conclude that the result of an effective independent 
audit committee mechanism serves “to satisfy the need of both internal and external users of financial statements” (p.185). Aanu, 
Odianonsen and Foyeke (2014) argue for the importance of the governance role played by the audit committee in protecting the 
interests of both shareholders and other stakeholders. Wang (2017) also report a positive relationship between audit committee 
reporting and long-term stakeholder sustainability management. 
Literature Review 
Independence is the main attribute of any audit committee as earlier asserted by Fama and Jensen (1983) who suggested that the 
independence of a non-executive director is a crucial quality that contributes to the effectiveness of audit committee monitoring 
function. In the context of the stakeholder theory, this attribute is an essential quality of the audit committee which enables it to 
effectively perform its oversight role. A significant amount of empirical work has been undertaken in the context of audit committee 
independence and its impact on the financial sector.  The role of a firm’s audit committee in the enforcement of corporate governance 
principles, thus enhancing firm value cannot be gainsaid.  
A study by Y. A. Al-Matari, Al-Swidi, Bt Fadzil and E. Al-Matari (2012) examined the relationship between the internal corporate 
governance mechanism related to the board of directors, the audit committee characteristics and the performance of the Saudi 
companies listed in the Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE) in 2010.  Firstly, the study found that the results were not consistent with the 
expectations from the agency theory that board of directors and audit committee might mitigate agency problems leading to reduced 
agency cost by aligning the interests of controlling owners with those of the company.  
 Regarding audit committee independence, the results found a positive but statistically insignificant relationship to firm performance 
as measured by ROA and ROE. Fadun (2013) examined the relationship between corporate governance and performance of insurance 
firms in Nigeria using data derived from five consecutive years (2006 to 2010) for 10 insurance firms listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. The corporate governance mechanisms investigated in this study were board size, CEO duality, audit committee, dividend 
policy and annual general meeting. Performance measured using ROA. The study found a significant and positive relationship 
between audit committee independence and firm performance, implying that firm performance is enhanced through robust 
implementation of the audit function. 
The work of Aanu et al., (2014) on the influence of audit committee effectiveness on firm performance found that there was a positive 
significant relationship between independence and financial expertise of the audit committee and ROA and ROE. Al-Matari, Al-
Swidi and Bt Fadzil (2014) examined the relationship between audit committee characteristics such as committee size, independence 
and meetings, among other, on the performance of firms listed in the Muscat Security Market (MSM).  In these authors’ view, there 
is a surprisingly insignificant relationship between audit committee independence and ROA. This is nonetheless consistent with 
previous studies such as Al-Matari et al., (2012) that had found no association between audit committee independence and ROA in 
developing countries. These authors contend that the insignificant result of audit committee independence would imply that it could 
be plausible to appoint individuals with technical expertise and experience in order to guarantee value creation.  
In a study that explored the influence of audit committee effectiveness on firm performance of 25 manufacturing firms in Nigeria 
which focused on the variables of independence, financial expertise, size and meetings of audit committee, Aanu et al., (2014) found 
a significant positive relationship between independence and financial expertise and firm performance measured on ROA, ROE and 
return on capital employed (ROCE). However, committee size and number of meetings showed no significant relationship with the 
performance measures. Ebere, Ibanichuka and Ogbonna (2016) examined audit committee and financial performance of quoted 
insurance companies in Nigeria (2008-2014).  
The objective of the study was to determine the extent to which audit committee characteristics affect ROA and ROE of the listed 
companies using data from ten listed insurance firms in Nigeria Stock Exchange. The results from regression analysis indicated that 
while audit committee size does not affect ROA and ROE, there was a statistically significant relationship between committee 
independence and firm performance using ROA and ROE. 
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Glover-Akpey and Azembila (2016) investigated the effect of audit committees on the performance of firms listed on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange (GSE). The characteristics of audit committee examined in the study were the number of meetings, financial 
expertise and number of independent members of the audit committee. The study findings indicated that more independent directors 
in the audit committee negatively influenced firm performance. It concluded that corporate governance debate should change focus 
from independence of the committee to issues related to membership experience and financial literacy of the members.   
H0: For the purpose of this study, it was postulated that audit committee independence has no statistically significant effect on the 
performance of insurance firms in Kenya. 
Research and Methodology 
The study used correlational research design and covered all the 55 insurance (52) and reinsurance (3) firms licensed by Kenya 
insurance industry regulator (IRA) in the years 2017 and 2018. The subject of the study were 645 board members, audit committee 
members, CEOs, CFOs and internal auditors distributed as follows:  
Table 1: Population and Sample Distribution 
 Category of Respondents Population Sample 
1 Board of directors 369 186 
2 Audit committee 111 61 
3 CEOs 55 55 
4 CFOs 55 55 
5 Internal auditors 55 55 
TOTAL 645 412 
 
 A statistical sample of board of directors and audit committee was derived using the model  where, n is the 
sample size,  is the margin error (equal to half the confidence interval width) of 0.25 for board of directors and the audit committee 
members, and  is the standard deviation of the number of board of directors and audit committee members. For the remaining 
three categories, a census was done given that the companies have one each. The primary data was collected using a questionnaire 
instrument with a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree. The secondary data for the 
population of the study and the audited financial reports for year 2017 were acquired from the databases of IRA and the Association 
of Kenya Insurers (AKI). The data collection instruments were subjected to pilot testing for reliability using Crobach’s Alpha and 
for validity using KMO and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity. 
The data was analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistics. For descriptive analysis, frequency distribution, percentage, means 
and standard deviation were computed. For inferential analysis, factor analysis, correlations, chi-square, analysis of variance and 
regression analysis were done. As a prerequisite analysis for regression tests, tests for normality, multicollinearity test, test for 
heteroskedasticity and test for homoskedasticity were carried out.  
Result and Discussion  
The study sought to investigate the effect of Audit Committee Independence (AUDIND) on the performance of insurance firms in 
Kenya. This section presents the findings of the study under the audit committee independence variable. 
Percentage Distribution for Audit Committee Independence  
Table 2 presents frequency and percentage distribution of respondents’ views on the relationship between audit committee 
independence and firm performance. 
From the results, 68% of the respondents opine that the proportion of independent directors in the audit committee positively affects 
the performance of insurance firms in Kenya, while 29.1% were against (19.2%) or uncertain (9.9%). On the question of whether 
more independent directors in the audit committee leads to better firm performance, 82.9% of the respondents were positive while 
15.6% were either against or uncertain (11.4%). Meanwhile, 87.7% of the respondents were positive that more independent directors 
in the audit committee improve corporate transparency. On the reliability of corporate disclosures, 74.5% of the respondents support 
that more independent directors in the audit committee ensures better/reliable corporate disclosure, while 24.3% were against (13.8%) 
or uncertain (10.5%) about the assertion. Further, 75.7% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that more independent directors 
in the audit committee improves quality/clarity of financial reports, as opposed to 21.6% who are either against (8.7%) or uncertain 
(12.9%). On the aspect of more independent directors on board effectiveness, 80.5% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed.  
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Table 2: Frequency and Percentage Distribution for AUDIND 
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The proportion (%) of independent directors in the audit 
committee positively affects the performance of insurance firms 
in Kenya 
3.6% 15.6% 9.9% 51.5% 16.5% 3.0% 
The more independent directors in the audit committee the better 
firm performance 
2.1% 2.1% 11.4% 52.1% 30.8% 1.5% 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves 
corporate transparency 
0.9% 0.6% 8.4% 37.1% 50.6% 2.4% 
More independent directors in the audit committee ensures 
better/reliable corporate disclosure 
11.1% 2.4% 10.5% 33.2% 41.3% 1.5% 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves 
quality/clarity of financial reports 
2.4% 6.3% 12.9% 39.5% 36.2% 2.7% 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves the 
effectiveness of the board 
2.1% 3.0% 12.6% 53.0% 27.5% 1.8% 
Audit committee should always be chaired by an independent 
non-executive director 
3.0% 6.0% 9.0% 35.0% 44.0% 3.0% 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves the 
internal audit process 
0.9% 4.8% 7.5% 48.8% 36.5% 1.5% 
More independent directors in the audit committee protects non-
shareholder stakeholders 
2.1% 6.0% 10.2% 38.3% 41.9% 1.5% 
 
The study also found that 79% of the respondents support that audit committee should always be chaired by an independent non-
executive director, while 85.3% confirm that more independent directors in the audit committee improves the internal audit process. 
Finally, 80.2% of the respondents are of the opinion that more independent directors in the audit committee protects non-shareholder 
stakeholders. Overall, 79% of all the respondents were of the view that more independent directors in the board improves board 
performance which, in turn, leads to improved firm performance. 
Descriptive Statistics for Audit Committee Independence 
In the last section, the study confirmed the results of the percentage distributions of audit committee independence. In this section, it 
reveals the descriptive statistics for audit committee independence in terms of mean, mode, median and standard deviation. The result 
is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Audit Committee Independence 
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The proportion (%) of independent directors in the audit committee positively 
affects the performance of insurance firms in Kenya 
334 0 3.53 4.00 4 1.212 
The more independent directors in the audit committee the better firm 
performance 
334 0 4.03 4.00 4 .967 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves corporate 
transparency 
334 0 4.29 5.00 5 .999 
More independent directors in the audit committee ensures better/reliable 
corporate disclosure 
334 0 3.87 4.00 5 1.356 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves quality/clarity of 
financial reports 
333 1 3.94 4.00 4 1.160 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves the effectiveness 
of the board 
334 0 3.96 4.00 4 .999 
Audit committee should always be chaired by an independent non-executive 
director 
334 0 4.02 4.00 5 1.234 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves the internal audit 
process 
334 0 4.11 4.00 4 .971 
More independent directors in the audit committee protects non-shareholder 
stakeholders 
334 0 4.07 4.00 5 1.089 
Table 3 above shows that the mean ranged from 3.53 to 4.29. The median of the study is 4.00 while the mode is 4. The standard 
deviation ranged from 0.967 to 1.356. This means that there was a relatively small dispersion between the opinions of the respondents 
on the statement that the more independent directors in the audit committee the better firm performance. 
Cross-Tabulation between Demographic Information and AUDIND 
Table 4 presents a cross-tabulation data between level of education and audit committee independence. The results show that 79.2% 
of the respondents with bachelor’s degree are positive that the more independent directors in the audit committee the better firm 
performance, a finding supported by 81.4% of master’s degree holders, 93.8% of PhD holders and 72.2% of holders of other 
professional qualifications. Notably, 28.8% of the respondents who hold other professional qualifications were uncertain about 
whether more independent directors in the audit committee leads to better firm performance. 
Table 4: Cross-Tabulation between Education and AUDIND 
  The more independent directors in the audit committee the better firm performance Total 
Missing Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly 
Agree 
H
ig
he
st
 le
ve
l o
f E
du
ca
tio
n  
Bachelor’s 
degree 
3 3 2 3 20 22 53 
5.7% 5.7% 3.8% 5.7% 37.7% 41.5% 100.0% 
Master’s degree 2 4 5 26 110 52 199 
1.0% 2.0% 2.5% 13.1% 55.3% 26.1% 100.0% 
PhD 0 0 0 4 35 25 64 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 6.3% 54.7% 39.1% 100.0% 
Any Other 0 0 0 5 9 4 18 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 27.8% 50.0% 22.2% 100.0% 
Total 5 7 7 38 174 103 334 
1.5% 2.1% 2.1% 11.4% 52.1% 30.8% 100.0% 
 
Overall, 83% of all respondents were positive (agreed/strongly agreed) about statement that ‘The more independent directors in the 
audit committee the better firm performance’, implying that more independent directors in the audit committee leads to better 
financial performance of insurance firms in Kenya. 
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Factor Analysis (EFA) for Audit Committee Independence  
Table 5 below illustrates the suitability of the data for running factor analysis on the effect of audit committee independence on firm 
performance using the KMO test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity that tests for sampling adequacy. The study showed KMO statistics 
value of 0.881 and a Barlett’s test of sphericity of p-value of 0.000 < 0.01. 
Table 5: KMO and Bartlett's Test for Audit Committee Independence 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .881 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 1456.091 
df 36 
Sig. .000 
Table 6 shows the loading for the measurement model with coefficients ranging between 0.680 and 0 .869, indicating that the 
variables are almost perfectly related to factor pattern and clear factor structure with an acceptable level of cross loadings. 
Table 6: Component Matrix for Audit Committee Independence 
  Component 
The proportion (%) of independent directors in the audit committee positively affects the performance of insurance 
firms in Kenya 
.869 2 
The more independent directors in the audit committee the better firm performance .728 1 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves corporate transparency .803 1 
More independent directors in the audit committee ensures better/reliable corporate disclosure .755 1 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves quality/clarity of financial reports .839 1 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves the effectiveness of the board .775 1 
Audit committee should always be chaired by an independent non-executive director .694 1 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves the internal audit process .680 1 
More independent directors in the audit committee protects non-shareholder stakeholders .777 1 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a. 2 components extracted. 
 
Chi-Square Test for AUDIND and Firm Performance 
In this section, the chi-square test of independence shows evidence of the relationship between audit committee independence and 
firm performance. The results in Table 7 confirms that firm performance is dependent on audit committee independence as it proves 
that the p-value is less than 0.05. The null hypothesis that audit committee independence and firm performance are independent is 
rejected.  
Table 7: Chi-Square Test for AUDIND and Firm Performance 
Chi-Square Tests 
  Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 24.696a 15 .024 
Likelihood Ratio 28.195 15 .020 
Linear-by-Linear Association .659 1 .417 
N of Valid Cases 334 
  
a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22. 
 
One-Way ANOVA on AUDIND and Firm Performance 
Table 8 shows that audit committee independence has a significant mean score difference with firm performance F(26, 307) = 6.144, 
p = 0.000 < 0.05. 
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Table 8: One-Way ANOVA for AUDIND and Firm Performance 
ANOVA 
Audit Committee Independence 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between Groups 67.474 26 2.595 6.144 .000 
Within Groups 129.682 307 .422     
Total 197.156 333       
 
Correlations between AUDIND and Firm Performance  
In this section, the study assesses the significance of the relationship between firm performance and audit committee independence. 
From the results in Table 9, it is clear that audit committee independence has a statistically significant effect on firm performance. It 
shows that audit committee independence correlates with firm performance (r= 0.468**, p< 0.01, N= 334). This finding implies that 
audit committee independence significantly enhances the performance of insurance firms in Kenya. 
Table 9: Correlations between AUDIND and Firm Performance 
Correlations 
  Firm Performance Audit Committee Independence 
Firm Performance Pearson Correlation 1 .468** 
Sig. (2-tailed)   .000 
N 334 334 
Audit Committee 
Independence 
Pearson Correlation .468** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000   
N 334 334 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Regression Analysis, Hypotheses Testing for AUDIND and Firm Performance 
Regression Analysis  
The R2 of the model was 0.219 as presented in Table 10. This means that 21.9 percent of the variation in the performance in insurance 
companies in Kenya is explained by the number of independent audit committee members in the board. The results indicate that the 
calculated F-Statistic is F(1, 332) = 93.097, p = 0.000 < 0.05. A unit increase in the number of independent audit committee members 
causes an increase of 0.016 in firm performance. The study indicates that audit committee independence positively and significantly 
improves the performance of insurance firms in Kenya. 
Table 10: Regression Analysis for Audit Committee Independence 
Variables  B Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 3.537 .006 561.695 .000 
The proportion (%) of independent directors in the audit committee positively affects 
the performance of insurance firms in Kenya 
.009 .001 8.592 .000 
The more independent directors in the audit committee the better firm performance -.004 .002 -2.423 .016 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves corporate transparency .002 .002 .934 .351 
More independent directors in the audit committee ensures better/reliable corporate 
disclosure 
.008 .001 6.438 .000 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves quality/clarity of financial 
reports 
-.005 .002 -2.946 .003 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves the effectiveness of the 
board 
.001 .002 .907 .365 
Audit committee should always be chaired by an independent non-executive director .001 .001 .817 .414 
More independent directors in the audit committee improves the internal audit process -.001 .002 -.400 .689 
More independent directors in the audit committee protects non-shareholder 
stakeholders 
.006 .001 4.068 .000 
Audit Committee Independence 0.016 0.002 9.649 .000 
F statistics (p value) 93.097(0.000) 
R squared 0.219 
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance 
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Hypothesis Testing for Audit Committee Independence 
The hypothesis was tested at 95% confidence level based on the results of the linear regression model whose results were presented 
in Table 10. The requirement for this study was to reject the null hypothesis if the calculated p-value was greater than the critical p-
value of 0.05. The null hypothesis stated that audit committee independence does not significantly affect the performance of insurance 
in Kenya. The calculated p-value was found to be less than the critical p-value of 0.05. This led to the rejection of the null hypothesis, 
and the conclusion made that audit committee independence significantly affects firm performance.  
The objective of this study was to examine the effect of audit committee independence on the performance of insurance firms in 
Kenya. The study found that audit committee independence significantly influences firm performance in Kenya. This variable was 
analyzed in terms of proportion of independent directors, firm performance, corporate transparency, corporate disclosure, clarity of 
financial reports, board effectiveness, non-executive director, internal audit process, and protection of non-shareholder stakeholders. 
The mean for parameters of audit committee independence ranged from 3.53 to 4.29. The study also reveals that the standard deviation 
ranged from 0.967 to 1.356, which means that the variables were highly dispersed. Furthermore, the findings from the One-way 
ANOVA reveals that there is a statistically significant mean score difference between audit committee independence and firm 
performance with a p-value of 0.000, which is significant at 0.01. The audit committee independence caused 21.9 percent variation 
in firm performance, (R2=0.219). The linear regression analysis shows that audit committee independence significantly predicts firm 
performance β = 0.624, t(334) = 9.649, p<0.000. 
Discussions 
This study found that audit committee independence is significant in enhancing organizational performance. It reveals that the 
proportion of independent directors in the audit committee positively and significantly affects the performance of insurance firms in 
Kenya. This finding supports that of Al-Matari et al., (2012) who examined the relationship of the internal corporate governance 
mechanism in relation to the board of directors, the audit committee characteristics and firm performance and found a positive but 
statistically insignificant relationship with firm performance measured by ROA and ROE. Fadun (2013), on the other hand, examined 
the relationship between corporate governance and performance of insurance firms and confirmed the findings of Al-Matari et al., 
(2012) that there exist a positive and significant relationship between audit committee independence and firm performance, implying 
that firm performance is enhanced through robust implementation of the audit function. 
Further, the current study is contrary to Aanu et al., (2014) who explored the influence of audit committee effectiveness on firm 
performance of 25 manufacturing firms in Nigeria and found that committee size and number of meetings showed no significant 
relationship with the performance. Similarly, the finding of current study contradicts that of Glover-Akpey and Azembila (2016) who 
investigated the effect of audit committees on the performance of firms using the number of meetings, financial expertise and number 
of independent members of the audit committee and found that there is a statistically significant but negative relationship between 
independent members of the audit committee with the firm performance. 
The current study examined whether more independent directors in the audit committee improves the effectiveness of the board and 
found that there is a positive but insignificant relationship between the size of the independent board members in the audit committee 
and the effectiveness of the board. This finding differed from Aanu et al., (2014) who found that there was positive significant 
relationship between independence and financial expertise of the audit committee and ROA and ROE. Contrary, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) in their study found that the independence of a non-executive director is a crucial quality that contributes to the effectiveness 
of audit committee monitoring function. 
The AUDIND variable also assessed the effect of more independent directors in the audit committee improves the reliability corporate 
disclosure. The study found that more independent directors in audit committee positively and significantly affects reliability 
corporate disclosure. This finding is consistent with Ebere et al., (2016) who examined audit committee and financial performance 
of quoted insurance companies in Nigeria and found a statistically significant relationship between audit committee independence 
and firm performance in terms of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). E.M. Al-Matari et al., (2014) examined the 
relationship between audit committee characteristics, such as independence, on the performance of firms listed in the Muscat Security 
Market and found insignificant relationship between audit committee independence and ROA. 
Finally, the study examined the effect of more independent directors in the audit committee and how that affects the quality and 
clarity of financial reports. The findings revealed a negative and significant relationship between the two variables. This finding is 
inconsistent with the finding of Fama and Jensen (1983) who found that audit committee independence is an essential quality of the 
audit committee which enables it to effectively perform its oversight role. 
Conclusions 
The study examined the effect of audit committee independence on the performance of insurance firms in Kenya and concluded that 
independence of the audit committee has a positive and significant effect on firm performance. It established that independent 
directors protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. Hence, the research concludes that more independent directors 
in the audit committee is healthy for the better performance of insurance firms in Kenya.  
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The study recommends that insurance companies should be keen on the proportion of independent directors in the audit committee 
since it was established that more independent directors in the audit committee enhances firm performance. Firm performance is also 
enhanced by being more transparent, reliable and effective in ensuring that quality and clarity of financial reports are achieved.  
References 
Aanu, S. O., Odianosen, I. F. & Foyeke, O.I. (2014). Effectiveness of audit committee and firm financial performance in Nigeria: an 
empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Auditing: Research and Practice. Retrieved July 5, 2017, from 
http://www.ibimapublishing.com/journal/JAARP/jaarp.html 
Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K. & Bt Fadzil, F. H. (2014). Audit committee characteristics and executive committee characteristics 
and firm performance in Oman: empirical study. Asian Social Science, 10(12), 98-113 
Al-Matari, Y. A., Al-Swidi, A. K., Bt Fadzil, F. H. & Al-Matari, E. M. (2012). Board of directors, audit committee characteristics 
and performance of Saudi Arabia listed companies. International Review of Management and Marketing, 2(4), 241-251 
Baydoun, N., Maguire, W., Ryan, N., & Willet, R. (2013). Corporate governance in five Arabian Gulf countries. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 20(1), 7-22 
Braga-Alves, M. V. & Shastri, K. (2011). Corporate governance, valuation, and performance: evidence from a voluntary market 
reform in Brazil. Financial Management Journal, 40(1), 139-157 
Davies, M. and & Schlitzer, B. (2008). The impracticality of an international “one size fits all” corporate governance code of best 
practice.  Managerial Auditing Journal, 23(6), 532-544 
Ebere, C. C., Ibanichuka, E. A. L & Ogbonna, G. N. (2016). Corporate governance system and financial performance of quoted 
insurance companies in Nigeria. International Journal of Business & Law Research, 4(4), 34-41 
Fadun, O. S. (2013). Corporate governance and insurance firm’s performance: empirical study of Nigerian experience. Journal of 
Insurance Law & Practice, 3(1), 11-31 
Fama, E. F.  & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26, 301-325  
Foo, J. & Witkowska, D. (2011). The role of corporate governance in transition countries. International Journal of Latest Trends in 
Finance and Economic Sciences, 1(2), pp.44-53 
Glover-Akpey, I. & Azembila, A. B.  (2016). The effect of audit committees on the performance of firms listed on the Ghana Stock 
Exchange. OSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSR-JBM), 18(11), 55-62 
Heenetigala, K., & Armstrong, A. (2011). The impact of corporate governance on firm performance in an unstable economic and 
political environment: evidence from Sri Lanka. Conference on financial markets and corporate governance, 13, 1-17 
IRA CGG (2011) Corporate Governance Guidelines for insurance and reinsurance companies. Retrieved November 30th, 2018, 
from Insurance Regulatory Authority: https://www.ira.go.ke/index.php/regulatory-framework/prodential-
guidelines/guidelines-to-insurers 
King III (2009). King code of governance principles for South Africa. Retrieved November 28, 2018, from Institute of Directors of 
South Africa (IoDSA): https://www.iodsa.co.za 
King IV (2016). King report on corporate governance for South Africa. Reteieved November 21, 2018, from Institute of Directors 
of South Africa (IoDSA):  
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/resmgr/king_iv/King_IV_Report/IoDSA_King_IV_Report_-
_WebVe.pdf 
Luhman, J. & Cunliffe, A. L. (2013). Key Concepts in Organization Theory. London, UK: SAGE Publications Ltd 
M.Z. Islam, M. Z., M.N. Islam, M. N. & A.K.M.Z. Islam, A. K. M. Z. (2010). Agency problem and the role of audit committee: 
implications for corporate sector in Bangladesh. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 2(3), 177–188 
Malik, M. S. & Makhdoom, D. D. (2016). Does corporate governance beget firm performance in Fortune Global 500 companies. 
Corporate Governance, 16(4), pp.747-764, https://doi.org/10/1108/CG-12-2015-0156 
Momoh, O. A. & Ukpong, M.S. (2013). Corporate governance and its effects on the Nigerian insurance industry. European Journal 
of Globalization and Development Research, 8(1), 476-491 
Okeahalam, C. C. (2004). Corporate governance and disclosure in Africa: issues and challenges. Journal of Financial Regulation 
and Compliance, 12(4), pp.359-370, https://doi.org/10.1108/13581980410810902 
Ibrahim et al., International Journal of Research in Business & Social Science 8(6)(2019) 15-24 
 
 24 
Price, R., Roman, F. J. & Rountree, B. (2010). The impact of governance reform on performance and transparency. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 99(2011), 76-96. Retrieved June 30, 2017 from https://www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec 
Sookram, R. (2016). Corporate governance in the emerging economics of the Caribbean: peculiarities, challenges, and a future 
pathway. The Journal of Values-Based Leadership, 9(1), Article 9. Available at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/jvbl/vol9/iss1/9 
Wang, M-C. (2017). The relationship between firm characteristics and the disclosure of sustainability reporting. Sustainability, 9(4), 
1-14 
 
 
 
 
 
